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A message to:
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 
AUDIT COMMITTEES
Auditors do not become 
a part of or operate under 
the control of management 







A Response to the SEC’s 
Accounting Series Release 264 
From the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants
American Institute of CPAs 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, N.Y. 10036
M
ost of the nation’s 27,000 
certified public accounting firms 
have a long-standing capability of 
providing various types of 
management advisory services to clients. 
This capacity developed initially in response 
to demands from clients for assistance with 
setting up accounting and internal control 
systems and has expanded over the years to 
cover a wide range of management 
problems.
Now these services are being 
challenged and the accounting profession 
believes the challenges are unjustified. Here 
is the background.
On June 15, 1979, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission issued an interpretive 
release that raised the question: Might the 
independence of an auditor be impaired 
when the client also engages the auditor for 
management advisory services? The SEC 
suspects that might be the case. So, it 
published the interpretive release identified 
formally as Accounting Series Release 
Number 264. Interested parties were asked 
to comment.
Concern within the profession over 
the impact of this release stems from 
possible misunderstandings of the SEC 
action. The release could be read various 
ways: As a directive designed to eliminate 
engagement of CPAs for consulting services 
by their audit clients,or simply as an attempt 
to alert CPAs and their clients to be more 
concerned about independence.
No Ban on MAS
ASR 264 is not a ruling—it does not 
proscribe CPAs from offering management 
advisory services (MAS); it does not set new 
criteria for a client to engage CPAs for 
advisory services. But the tone of the ASR 
can lead companies to opposite conclusions. 
As a result, some companies are thinking 
about not engaging their auditors to perform 
MAS engagements in the future without more 
proof of the high level of benefits.
We believe that was not the intent of 
the SEC. In issuing the release, we think the 
SEC merely sought to search out whether 
there are hazards involved for the public at 
large. With a hundred years of providing 
MAS, and no evidence of actual impairment 
of the CPA’s independence, we think there is 
no basis for concern.
Safeguards for Independence
It is understandable that the SEC is 
interested in safeguarding auditor 
independence. Certainly CPAs share that 
concern. Our record through the years 
attests to that. The profession’s standards 
and Rules of Conduct embody the most 
stringent prohibitions to safeguard 
independence of any professional group. 
Continuous refinements in these prohibitions, 
the specificity of the CPA’s ethical code and 
the professional attitude of the practitioner all 
reflect the CPA’s concern for independence.
Apart from these internal 
requirements, the profession has reached 
out for what amounts to independent second 
and even third opinions on the effect of 
performing MAS on the CPA’s independence. 
Two separate commissions with outside 
experts directing the research conducted 
studies over a period of many months. Both 
studies report no evidence was uncovered to 
suggest any impairment of the auditor’s 
independence as a result of providing MAS. 
However, they did make certain 
recommendations which might enhance the 
appearance of independence. These were 
promptly implemented by the profession.
The critical issue in this controversy 
— Does MAS impair an auditor’s indepen­
dence?— turns on the fact that advisory 
services do not entail CPAs making 
management’s decisions. Client manage­
ments do not abdicate their role so easily. 
This separation from management is a key 
point. Auditors do not become a part of or 
operate under the control of management 
simply because they offer advice.
That is the reason why, despite the 
unnumbered times CPAs have advised 
clients on business matters, there is no 
recorded incident that clearly shows MAS 
impairs the ability of CPAs to conduct 
independent audits.
We believe MAS actually improves 
the performance of CPAs as auditors 
because it provides a deeper knowledge of 
client companies. This reduces the 
dependence of CPAs on management 
representations and helps them make more 
informed audit judgments.
Benefits of MAS
Other benefits also flow from MAS 
by CPAs. Designing accounting and control 
systems results in more reliable financial 
information. Also, increased familiarity with a 
company’s operation can result in reductions 
in the cost of audits. Moreover, the SEC 
acknowledges the benefits of CPA firms 
providing advice on internal accounting 
control systems.
The charge that MAS could impair a 
CPA’s independence implies there would be 
some incentive to cover up misrepresented 
financial information when a CPA firm 
accepts additional MAS assignments from an 
audit client. This fails to recognize that an 
auditor serves many clients and he has too 
much at risk to allow his independence to be 
compromised. Also there are other powerful 
countervailing pressures at work—exposure 
to legal liability and possible loss of license.
Boards of Directors and Audit 
Committees are clearly responsible to 
determine that their outside auditors are 
independent. In making this judgment the 
contents of ASR 264 should be viewed in the 
context of the strong forces that assure the 
independence of auditors. We believe these 
far outweigh any hypothetical dangers and 
that there are substantial benefits to be 
gained by engaging CPA firms to provide 
management advisory services.
